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INTRODUCTION
A number of professional sectors have recently moved away from their longstanding 
career model of up- or- out promotion and embraced innovative alternatives. Professional 
labor is a critical resource in professional service firms. Therefore, changes to these inter-
nal labor markets are likely to trigger other innovations, for example in knowledge man-
agement, incentive schemes and team composition. In this chapter we look at how new 
career models affect the core organizing model of professional firms and, in turn, their 
capacity for and processes of innovation. We consider how professional firms link the 
development of human capital and the division of professional labor to distinctive 
demands for innovation and how novel career systems help them respond to these 
demands.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, we describe the nature of innovation in profes-
sional service firms (PSFs), arguing that in important ways this differs from innovation 
in other types of firm. Second, we outline the organizing model of professional firms, 
explaining how their incentive structure, leverage ratio, team composition and billing 
arrangements shape the transfer and utilization of expertise as teams of professionals 
transform know- how into services and client relationships. Third, we describe the career 
model, and specifically the tournament promotion system at its core, by which PSFs 
have traditionally staffed its ranks with professionals of adequate quality to sustain 
their organizing model. Fourth, we show how such tournament promotion systems 
have come under pressure and present data from our own research on how elite UK 
law firms have responded by introducing new positions and an alternative career model 
altogether. Finally, we discuss the impact of the alternative career model upon the organ-
izing model of these firms and, in turn, on their capacity for entrepreneurial action and 
innovation.
INNOVATION IN PROFESSIONAL SERVICE FIRMS
PSFs are distinctive with regard to both their inputs and their outputs (Greenwood, Li, 
Prakash & Deephouse, 2005). On the input side, professional service firms are highly 
reliant on knowledge (Alvesson, 1995; Starbuck, 1992). They deploy a mix of formal and 
tacit knowledge that professional staff embody and translate into outputs, in the form 
of customized solutions for clients. Because these firms are built on the use of exper-
tise, either held by their professional staff or embedded in codified methodologies and 
tools (Hansen, Nohria & Tierney, 1999; Werr & Stjernberg, 2003), innovation occurs 
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through the development or recombination of existing knowledge in the firm (see also 
Chapter 2).
Innovation may be triggered by external technological or regulatory change (Suddaby 
& Greenwood, 2001) or by pressures from clients for novel solutions to their problems. 
Innovation may also occur as professionals inside the firm seek to create new services in 
order to cement their reputation and enhance their chances of promotion to partner 
(Anand, Gardner & Morris, 2007). Most importantly, innovation is constantly driven by 
the need to overcome the problem of knowledge commoditization. As solutions to client 
problems become widely known, professional service firms become susceptible to price 
reductions and reputational damage associated with delivering “cookie- cutter” solutions. 
In consulting firms this is particularly related to the spread of fads and fashions (e.g. 
Morris, 2001; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2001). In law firms, it is intrinsic to the provision 
of legal solutions where there are always at least two parties involved and each side can 
inspect the solutions of the other. Therefore, for PSFs, innovation is a necessity. While 
drivers to innovate may be similar to those of other organizations, the process of 
 innovation in professional service firms differs considerably from that in other sorts of 
 organizations.
Innovation in various types of organizations has been described as suffering from the 
dichotomy of “exploitation” and “exploration” (March, 1991). Both exploitation and 
exploration are associated with learning—but the nature of that learning differs. 
Exploitation incrementally builds on existing knowledge and aims to meet the needs of 
existing customers. Exploration, conversely, develops new knowledge, departing from 
routines, and drives entry into new product- market domains (Benner & Tushman, 2003). 
Typically, firms find it difficult simultaneously to achieve exploitation, the operation and 
incremental improvement of existing competences, and exploration, the search for new 
ideas and ways of working, because of the different competences and routines that under-
pin them (March, 1991).
This exploration–exploitation dichotomy, however, is less applicable to professional 
service firms. This is because innovation is embedded within the core production 
process insofar as professional firms are required to produce complex, customized and 
often novel solutions to client problems. In this context, exploitation pertains to new 
assignments for existing clients that impose familiar demands, whereas exploration 
involves relationships with new partners that pose unprecedented and divergent 
demands (Beckman, Haunschild & Phillips, 2004). In this sense, professional firms use 
not only their internal resources, but also their relationships with external parties, 
typically customers, to hone and extend their expertise (Fosstenløkken, Løwendahl & 
Revang, 2003; see also Chapters 4 and 5). Innovation occurs incrementally and con-
tinuously, as professionals often pursue exploitation and exploration in their client 
engagements, using knowledge in both well- and little- understood ways (Taylor & 
Greve, 2006).
This leads to one further distinctive characteristic of professional firms. Rather than 
driving innovation through a dedicated team, as is frequently noted in studies of struc-
tural “ambidexterity” (e.g. O’Reilly, Tushman & Harreld, 2009), or through an R&D 
department, the onus of responding to novel and divergent market demands rests 
squarely on the shoulders of front- line professionals (Heusinkveld & Benders, 2005; 
Mom, Van Den Bosch & Volberda, 2007; see also Chapter 4). Thus, the nature of 
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innovation in professional service firms is distinctive in being embedded into the everyday 
work of professionals at the core of the firm rather than a separate organizational unit. 
Consequently, the way a professional firm attracts, organizes and retains staff through its 
career proposition is central to its capacity to innovate.
ORGANIZING MODEL OF THE PROFESSIONAL SERVICE 
FIRM
Professional service firms have a relatively simple production process. Compared, for 
instance, to manufacturing organizations there are relatively few complexities such as 
extended supply chains, highly departmentalized systems of production that need struc-
tural coordination or extended marketing channels. Instead, the core of service produc-
tion centers on the deployment of expert knowledge to resolve client problems. 
Incentivized by learning opportunities, generous compensation and the prospect of pro-
motion, teams of professionals use their own knowledge or leverage that of their senior 
colleagues to execute professional problem- solving tasks for which the client is typically 
billed on the basis of the labor time of the professionals (i.e. the input cost). This means 
that the organizing model that governs how input is transformed into output is also dis-
tinctive. It is characterized by four elements: (1) incentive schemes, (2) leverage models, 
(3) team composition and (4) fee billing arrangements. We discuss each of these elements 
below and argue why staffing the firm in ways that are appropriate to meeting client 
demands is critical. Figure 7.1 depicts the organizing model.
Incentive Schemes
Professional firms operate in two markets simultaneously: for clients and for staff who 
embody the expert knowledge needed to address client problems (Maister, 1993). A key 
challenge for the firm is to provide adequate incentives to attract and retain sufficient 
numbers of the right quality of associates (Greenwood et al., 2005). In professional firms, 
these incentives can encompass both current and deferred compensation of various types. 
First, firms directly compensate in ways that are consistent with the growing experience 
and productivity of associates. Second, firms provide junior professionals with opportu-
nities for professional development by engaging them in challenging client work. Third, 
they offer opportunities for promotion to the partnership, which entails an equity stake 
in the firm and profit- sharing (Galanter & Palay, 1991; Greenwood et al., 2005; Malos & 
Campion, 2000). This combination of incentives, foremost among them the promotion 
system, secures the continued input and commitment of professional staff. Traditionally, 
for partners this has meant the delivery of innovative services by applying their knowl-
edge and experience to novel client problems; for associates it has meant long hours of 
delivering more routine services and know- what from knowledge management systems, 
commensurate with their junior experience, or engaging in more innovative services by 
assisting seniors and learning from them.
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Leverage Models
“Leverage” (Maister, 1993) closely relates to the human capital development offering to 
associates as well as the value of partnership. Associates initially borrow the skills and 
knowledge necessary to satisfy client demands from their principals (Gilson & Mnookin, 
1989; Werr & Stjernberg, 2003) and gradually build up their own experience as they carry 
out professional tasks under their principals’ supervision. Depending on the type of 
knowledge at stake, this leverage can take one of two forms (Werr & Stjernberg, 2003). 
Theoretical, easily articulated knowledge such as statutes, legal precedents, forms and 
applications can be codified in databases and knowledge systems for easy access and 
retrieval by juniors. More personal and tacit knowledge that features in the application 
of such theoretical knowledge is much harder to articulate and often remains embodied 
in the knowing individual. Hence, it is usually leveraged and transmitted in the personal 
supervision relationship, where associates can see it in action as their supervisors translate 
abstract theoretical knowledge into specific client solutions, or receive feedback on their 
own work.
Equally importantly, leverage sustains the basic division of labor between associates 
and partners in the professional firm and underpins the profits to partners (Hitt, Bierman, 
Shimizu & Kochhar, 2001; Malos & Campion, 2000; Sherer, 1995). By leveraging their 
knowledge and reputation through the employment of associates, partners can generate 
profits while not directly undertaking client work. Partners may then generate income 
from their own labor by undertaking chargeable work for clients, but they can also spend 
time generating future business and participating in the management of the firm, as 
owners. Juniors are freed from such managerial responsibilities to work on client assign-
ments, where they are charged out at rates and for time periods that generate total 
revenue greater than the associate’s employment cost. The resulting surplus accrues to 
the owners of the firm, namely the partners.
In this sense, leverage as associate- to- partner ratio, the level of innovation in services, 
and the economic performance of the firm are closely related. High leverage ratios are 
commensurate with highly codified knowledge packages and standardized methodolo-
gies that can be routinely applied by junior associates. Here, assignments are usually not 
cutting- edge, demanding innovative solutions. Conversely, lower leverage ratios are 
associated with experience or expertise models where knowledge is less reutilized. These 
models are geared towards more complex projects that place a premium on the experience 
or special expertise of more senior staff (Hansen et al., 1999; Maister, 1993). The mecha-
nism that mediates this relationship between leverage, innovation and performance is 
team composition.
Team Composition
Team composition directly reflects leverage and how a firm uses it to make a specific 
project or transaction profitable. Decisions about team composition involve choices 
about the mix of partners and associates of different experience levels (Werr & Stjernberg, 
2003) and about the distribution of tasks among team members. Partners or other seniors 
must actively delegate tasks to juniors rather than hoard work (Gilson & Mnookin, 1989) 
and, as a corollary, must devote some of their time to supervision and knowledge transfer 
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by working alongside juniors. At the level of the firm or individual practice, staffing deci-
sions are about making available appropriate numbers of professionals of differing sen-
iority levels required to deliver the type of transaction on which the firm is typically 
engaged or expects to be in the future. Hence, this strategic decision influences how teams 
are composed and how partners’ knowledge and reputation are leveraged (Maister, 
1993).
In any case, the workforce of the firm and the membership of each team are described 
by the shape of a pyramid whose width varies with the leverage ratio and therefore with 
the strategic positioning of the firm. Firms which strategically position themselves for the 
delivery of high- volume, standardized services will predominantly deploy highly lever-
aged teams. Their staff pyramid will have a broad base for most teams and for the firm 
overall. Firms and teams geared for more innovative, customized services will display a 
narrower base of associates per partner. Innovation is likely to be concentrated in these 
low- leverage, high- experience teams or firms. Hence, team composition as a corollary of 
leverage strongly influences which teams are likely to deliver innovative services and 
where in the team innovation originates.
Fee Billing Arrangements
Fee billing conventions differ across firms and across practices commensurate with the 
expected novelty of client problems, team composition, and leverage. Some services, for 
example in consulting, audit and corporate law, are based on a fixed fee agreed ex ante 
(albeit often with additional charges for unexpected overtime), while others such as tax 
law, accounting and other types of specialist advisory services are charged according to 
work time. Despite this variation, time- based billing arrangements have become per-
ceived as a strongly institutionalized practice across professional service firms (Kor & 
Leblebici, 2005; Yakura, 2001). Regardless of fee structure, firms valorize professionals’ 
time in monetary terms using time sheets or recording devices and often explicit time 
targets for “billable hours.” Associates’ success in completing appropriate billing targets 
forms an important part of promotion to partner decisions (Landers, Rebitzer & Taylor, 
1996).
Billing targets are therefore an important part of the monitoring and incentive systems 
in professional service firms. Moreover, they have an important influence on PSFs’ 
ability to innovate. Firms’ internal organization, promotion policies and economic 
models assume that they can deploy associates predictably on projects, ideally to the 
maximum of their billable hours target. The challenge for innovation is to balance this 
pressure to sustain high utilization levels, which fosters the exploitation of existing 
knowledge, with the need to explore and develop new knowledge, which requires non- 
billable activities.
Figure 7.1 summarizes the different elements of the organizing model and how each 
element impinges upon the firm’s capacity for innovation. It reflects how innovation 
in professional service firms is embedded within the core of the production process of 
the firm. Professionals innovate continuously as part of their day- to- day service 
 delivery.
Professionals are incentivized to deliver innovative services. Payment commensurate 
with experience, opportunities for professional development, and the possibility of 
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promotion to partner and co- ownership of the firm are part of the package. Professionals 
utilize their own knowledge or leverage that of their senior colleagues. Leverage manifest 
in the associate- to- partner ratio is associated with different types of knowledge and 
knowledge- sharing. A high leverage ratio is associated with services built on highly 
codified knowledge that can be applied by junior associates. Low leverage is consistent 
with the application of less reutilized knowledge, drawing on the experience and expertise 
of senior professionals whose supervision enhances the potential for innovation. Closely 
related to leverage is the composition of professionals in teams. Low- leverage teams are 
richer in terms of the experience and know- how of senior professionals that can be shared 
with juniors, suggesting greater innovative potential. The fourth element of the organiz-
ing model is the billing arrangement through which the firm charges for the professionals’ 
time. The billing arrangement has ramifications for innovation in the firm, because an 
emphasis on high utilization rates fosters exploitation of existing knowledge at the 
expense of exploration and the development of new knowledge. Non- billable activities of 
professionals are critical for the latter.
The four elements of the organizing model can be sustained only by recruiting, moti-
vating, developing and retaining the right numbers of professionals with the right quality 
of expertise. That is why the career model fuels and sustains the organizing model (see 
Figure 7.1). In the following section, we elaborate on the traditional and distinctive career 
model, the “up- or- out tournament for promotion to partner” in professional service 
firms, shedding light on how it feeds the organizing model and, in turn, sustains the 
capacity for innovation. We then draw on our data that captures recent changes to the 
up- or- out tournament model in elite UK law firms and discuss the implications of these 
changes for the organizing model and, consequently, the capacity for innovation in these 
firms.
THE UP- OR- OUT PROMOTION MODEL
Given the centrality of professionals and their knowledge to the success of professional 
service firms, it is unsurprising that the career model plays a crucial role in sustaining 
PSFs’ organizing model. Typically, elite firms in many professions have attracted, moti-
vated and retained staff of adequate number and quality by using what is termed the 
“up- or- out” model of promotion to partner (Galanter & Palay, 1991; Malos & Campion, 
1995).
The up- or- out model is a form of tournament promotion system (Galanter & Palay, 
1991; Gilson & Mnookin, 1985; Kordana, 1995; Landers et al., 1996; Lazear & Rosen, 
1981; Wilkins & Gulati, 1998). Candidates compete against each other for promotion to 
a limited number of positions at the next grade, and promotion is based on relative 
ranking rather than any individual’s absolute merits. Those who fail to make the grade 
are barred from subsequent promotion rounds (or tournaments) and, in the up- or- out 
version of the tournament, expected to leave the firm.
In professional service firms, the critical tournament occurs when associates seek pro-
motion to partner, moving from their status of salaried employee to co- owner and taking 
a profit- share of the firm. The promotion to partner decision has obviously desirable 
consequences for the candidate, but also important ramifications for the firm’s 
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reputation, ability to generate future profits, and number of co- owners who will share the 
total profits of the firm (Hitt et al., 2001). While the inevitable waste of good- quality 
professionals in whom the firm has invested substantial sums and who are likely to be 
highly productive makes this model seem a costly device to select a partner, its incentive 
and signaling properties explain its utility (Gilson & Mnookin, 1985, 1989). For the firm, 
the up- or- out system resolves the problem of incentivizing employees in a production 
process where effort is difficult to measure and the relationship between employee input 
(work effort) and output is complex. In such situations monitoring is costly and difficult, 
especially because partners or senior professionals are themselves engaged in production 
rather than management. Here an up- or- out promotion model provides a relatively 
cheap, easily manageable alternative. Employees sustain high effort and seek to develop 
competence in order to win the tournament prize of promotion to partner and a share of 
profits, as well as the status rewards which go with it.
Further, because the firm risks diluting profits per partner if it offers more new partner-
ship positions than it can sustain, the model ensures that only the “best of the best” 
remain in the firm while underperformers leave. It maintains an elite reputation that 
facilitates client acquisition and justifies higher hourly fees, while simultaneously helping 
to manage the number and quality of those promoted to profit- sharing status. Along the 
route to partnership, firms can weed out associates who fail to perform adequately or hire 
laterally to fill gaps in their teams and sustain appropriate leverage. It can thus be argued 
that the up- or- out tournament is consistent with professional and organizational values 
because it is instrumental in harnessing organizational reputation and professional exper-
tise.
By ensuring that candidates who fail to make partner leave rather than stay as non- 
partner associates the firm addresses three other related risks. First, it avoids the likely 
increased monitoring costs it would incur with passed- over candidates who lack the 
incentive of promotion to partner at a future point. Second, it frees up a development 
path for aspiring and competent associates who might otherwise be blocked by passed- 
over candidates. Third, it allows the firm to align its leverage profile (known as its leverage 
ratio) with its business model. A stock of career- plateaued associates is likely to be expen-
sive to employ and, unless the firm can generate enough work of an appropriate level of 
complexity, these associates will be engaged in routine work that is likely to be incom-
mensurate with their remuneration.
With these benefits accruing to the firm, why would employees take the risk of entering 
such a tournament for promotion? Undisputedly, the opportunity for promotion to part-
nership is the core component of deferred compensation. Gilson and Mnookin (1989) 
suggest that with low odds of tournament success the quid pro quo for taking this risk is 
that employees are also tacitly assured the promotion decision will take place within a 
finite period and they are not left hanging on indefinitely. Moreover, in preparing for the 
tournament, associates gain valuable general human capital that is valuable in the exter-
nal labor market even if they fail to make partner in the current firm. Some elite profes-
sional firms, such as McKinsey or Accenture, even tacitly assure staff that they will use 
their alumni networks actively to help failed candidates find new positions in client 
organizations.
Therefore, the up- or- out model has benefits for both parties: It generates high produc-
tivity with low monitoring costs for the firm and general (as well as firm- specific) human 
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capital for the individual. Accordingly, it became a strongly embedded institution in elite 
professional firms. The model originated among the elite New York law firms in the early 
years of the twentieth century as they institutionalized their employment models, owner-
ship form and governance structures (Galanter & Palay, 1991). In conditions of stable or 
growing supply and demand for legal work, it developed into an industry norm (Galanter 
& Palay, 1991). It was widely adopted by leading New York law firms (Sherer, 1995) and 
then by firms in the UK as well as in other professional services sectors such as manage-
ment consulting and accounting (Morris & Pinnington, 1998).
However, there is substantial evidence from the US—and some anecdotal evidence 
from other countries—that the up- or- out model has been modified or abandoned under 
pressure from market and institutional changes (e.g. Wilkins & Gulati, 1998). For over a 
decade, professional service firms have been under pressure to become more corporate or 
business- like in their structures and systems—including their promotion system. Changes 
in the labor market situation and the war for talent have especially challenged the utility 
of this model. Below, we present evidence from our own research that focused on how 
elite UK law firms responded to these pressures by adopting new career models and 
discuss implications for the firms’ ability to innovate. For a detailed discussion of the 
social, political and economic pressures behind these changes see Malhotra, Morris and 
Smets (2010).
TOURNAMENTS UNDER PRESSURE: CHANGING CAREER 
MODEL IN ELITE UK LAW FIRMS
We studied a sample of ten London corporate law firms to examine external pressures on 
the tournament promotion system, responses to these pressures as they manifested them-
selves in formal promotion policies as well as actual practice, and the perception of these 
responses across a variety of internal stakeholders. The firms in our sample rank in the 
top 30 by number of partners and fee volume, and compete with each other in both client 
and labor markets.
In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of changing promotion patterns and 
to understand their implications for the innovative capacity of individual firms, we col-
lected data at the field level, firm level and individual- actor level. First, we thoroughly 
scanned reports appearing in the legal media over the past five years to capture field- level 
discourse on career issues and policy responses by individual firms. Notably, during the 
core period of our data collection in 2007/08, the legal media was replete with examples 
of innovations to the promotion system being introduced in UK- based corporate law 
firms. For instance, the Lawyer Daily, the online newsletter of the largest trade publica-
tion for the UK legal sector, put out 380 news items related to issues of promotion to 
partnership and alternatives to partnership. This number makes up over a third of all 
news items the Lawyer Daily covered in this period. Among the headline stories high-
lighted in the subject line of the e- mail newsletter, promotion issues featured in over a 
quarter of all news items. This confirmed that pressures on the tournament system of 
promotion and emerging alternative structures were of central concern to the profession.
Second, we focused on firm- level data documenting changes to promotion policies in 
each firm in our sample. We accessed websites and intranets where policies are outlined 
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in some depth, and discussion pages provide useful insights into feedback on policy pro-
posals. Where available, we reviewed formal policy documents to understand how formal 
policies were changing, if at all.
Third, we interviewed a variety of internal stakeholders. We conducted 37 interviews, 
each interview lasting about one hour. Interviewees included two senior partners, four 
managing partners, eight other partners, ten HR managers or partners responsible for 
promotions, ten associates and three senior professionals in positions recently introduced 
as alternatives to partnership. We first interviewed the HR director, the managing partner 
and/or a partner responsible for promotions and careers, because they were expected to 
have played a significant role in devising the new promotion policy of the firm. We asked 
them to clarify the formal policy position of their firms, and to elaborate on recent or 
impending policy changes and how these were being enacted. We obtained rich informa-
tion on the different types of alternative roles to partnership that had been formally 
adopted across our sample and found considerable variation in the range and the extent 
to which alternative roles had been adopted.
We then interviewed other partners in the firm, both senior and those recently pro-
moted, who are likely to have a significant influence on how promotion policies get 
enacted on a day- to- day basis. We followed up with associates coming up for promotion 
to partner and senior professionals who had been bestowed with permanent, non- partner 
positions as part of the new promotion policy to capture their perceptions of and attitudes 
toward alternatives to partnership and how they affected their career plans and day- to- 
day work. The interviews with partners, associates and senior professionals in alternative 
roles revealed how the new promotion policy was being enacted and that there was a clear 
gap between the espoused policy and the policy in use. The interviewees also shed light 
on how changes to the promotion system were shaping the whole career model permeat-
ing the firm to affect the four elements of our organizing model. The latter gave us insights 
into how these changes would impact on the firm’s capacity for innovation.
Our analysis showed that most of the firms we investigated do not have—and some 
never had—a formal up- or- out policy but that the up- or- out rule nonetheless operates in 
practice. It was striking that most associates who fail to make partner leave the firm vol-
untarily, even in the absence of an up- or- out policy and with new options of permanent 
employment available to them. While some pockets of permanent employment have 
always existed in law firms, these roles addressed specific business needs on an ad hoc 
basis. It is the recent changes in the market for professional talent that persuaded the 
majority of firms in our sample to introduce new permanent positions and formalize 
existing ones, giving them a distinct job title, job description, set of benefits and qualifica-
tion criteria. We describe below the variety of permanent, non- partnered positions that 
have been formalized: of counsel and legal director, permanent associate, and profes-
sional support lawyer.
Of Counsel and Legal Director
The position of legal director or of counsel—a title borrowed and adapted from US law 
firms—is generally open to senior associates who are at least eight years qualified but have 
either not made partner or not applied to do so. Therefore, they are at or beyond the level 
of experience required for promotion to partnership but usually lack a strong enough 
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business case to be selected. The work of both of counsel and legal directors is similar to 
that of the most senior associates, including some elements of management, but none of 
the “rainmaking” and business development responsibilities that characterize partners’ 
work. Privileges of these positions include access to management information and a 
special status and respect within the firm and the marketplace. Additionally, remunera-
tion differs from that of associates. In all but one of our sample firms, the base remu-
neration of professionals in permanent positions is higher than that of senior associates. 
In addition, of counsel earn bonuses linked to firm performance, while associate bonuses 
are more closely linked to individual and practice performance. Linking the of counsel’s 
pay to that of the firm or practice in which they work is partly a motivating device and 
partly so that their pay is based on a similar principle to that of the profit- based rewards 
of partners.
Regarding the future career prospects for of counsel lawyers and legal directors, firms 
differ widely. Some firms did not expect them to be future candidates for partnership, 
while others would allow them subsequently to be proposed for partnership selection, 
provided a sufficiently strong business case could be made. However, without consider-
able control of clients this latter route is considered impractical. The re- entry of career- 
plateaued professionals into the partner tournament continues to be a highly contentious 
issue for HR directors and managing partners, because of its implications for the existing 
promotion to partner model, which includes selection criteria, competences and develop-
ment tracks inside the firm.
Permanent Associate
Permanent associate positions tend to be concentrated in areas with a strong need for 
experienced lawyers but a weak business case for partnership. Although it was an 
accepted fact in all respondent firms that permanent associates existed and had done so 
for many years, the formalization of their position and the growth in their numbers make 
this position different from previous years. Like of counsel or legal directors, candidates 
for this position are generally those associates who are eight or more years qualified and 
have failed to obtain partnership or will not be put up for promotion. Unlike them, 
however, permanent associates are retained for their experience and do not assume 
managerial responsibilities. Formal permanent associate positions address not only 
issues of talent retention but also the paradox that, traditionally in PSFs, the only way 
for professionals with great technical expertise to permanently remain with their firm was 
to get promoted to management positions for which they had not received any formal 
training (Greiner & Scharff, 1980).
Professional Support Lawyer (PSL)
PSLs are qualified lawyers who provide support for fee earning colleagues. They are 
typically paid a salary linked to associate rates but with limited bonus opportunities. 
Many are technical specialists with strong drafting skills used to resolve legal difficulties 
during transactions. In contrast to other permanent positions, the position of PSL is not 
necessarily geared towards unsuccessful candidates in the partnership tournament who 
would have been forced out of the firm under a strict up- or- out regime, but towards senior 
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associates who seek more flexible work demands. This role is not new, having existed for 
over 20 years in our sample of firms, but until recently it was very rare and informal. It 
rose to prominence with greater demands for work–life balance among “generation Y” 
associates. Accordingly, in each of our firms the overwhelming majority of PSLs are 
women, many of whom have taken the position to fit with raising a family. As PSLs are 
not directly fee earning, they can manage working hours more flexibly. With that, they 
are commonly assumed to be following an alternative path to that of the career lawyer 
and therefore off the partnership track.
However, we found formal policies on this point deliberately loose and varied. In two 
firms, policy initiatives are in place to create a separate career track to managing PSL, 
and in one firm it was considered to link to partnership selection. Four other firms con-
sidered medium- term changes to permit PSLs to move back into fee earning and re- enter 
the partnership track as associates. In this context, they are also expanding the position 
to a mix of retention and expertise building purposes or connecting it more closely to 
business development activities, establishing a closer link to criteria for partnership selec-
tion.
Intriguingly, while these new permanent, non- partner positions that formally contra-
dict the traditional principle of up- or- out changes were supposedly introduced to satisfy 
associate demand for better work–life balance and improved career prospects, we found 
it was mostly the associates who kept the traditional up- or- out model alive. They simply 
continue to leave the firm when passed over for partnership, even though they know the 
firm would never force them to do so. For them, this response to “failure” in the tourna-
ment for partnership continues to be the “done thing.” Hence, while new formal policies 
do away with the traditional “up- or- out” regime in theory, both career models coexist in 
practice. Thus, innovation in the promotion and career system has introduced important 
modifications to the traditional up- or- out model, but has not altogether displaced it 
(Malhotra et al., 2010; see also Galanter & Henderson, 2008; Wilkins & Gulati, 1998).
While modifications to the up- or- out model are enacted rather inconsistently, depend-
ing on associates’ uptake of new career positions, there is a consistent change to the 
general framing of associates’ careers. HR managers justified changes to the highly insti-
tutionalized up- or- out model with reference to socio- economic pressures in the labor 
market, but also by reframing the overall proposition of what a career should look like. 
In most of our sample firms, HR managers devised a structured career development 
process that emphasizes individual skill development to take associates up through the 
ranks of their current firm, but also enhance their external market value. Associates are 
to be offered a holistic learning and development experience without any expectation 
that unsuccessful candidates for promotion to partner should leave the firm. One firm 
explicitly formulated a framework called “the deal” in which the firm commits to provid-
ing associates with interesting and stimulating work on “leading edge” transactions, 
focusing on complex cases, and leaving more commoditized, routine tasks for their 
juniors.
This new framing is interesting, insofar as this development plan more explicitly 
acknowledges the need to build general skills that are valued in the external labor market 
and rests on two important assumptions: First, it assumes that there will be a steady flow 
of “leading edge” transactions on which to deploy junior professionals. Second, it 
assumes that these associates will be able to do more than routine work and will engage 
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in more innovative tasks. These changes to the promotion system, but also its underlying 
assumptions, have implications for these firms’ leverage model and incentive system that 
are likely to impact on their capacity for innovation.
CAREER MODEL, ORGANIZING MODEL AND CAPACITY 
FOR INNOVATION
In this section, we discuss how innovation in the career model of law firms entails changes 
to their organizing model, and how these, in turn, impact upon these firms’ capacity for 
innovation. Returning to the four elements of the organizing model outlined above, we 
see a number of implications, summarized in Figure 7.2, that can follow from the intro-
duction of a new career model in law firms.
Incentive Schemes
With the introduction of new permanent positions as alternatives to partnership, as well 
as the definition of clear criteria for admission to these, law firms have also highlighted 
more clearly what it takes to be promoted to partner. Those becoming PSLs, permanent 
associates, of counsel or legal directors invariably distinguish themselves through their 
long experience and technical expertise. However, they all usually lack the business case 
to qualify as a partner. Business development potential, the capacity to generate new 
business to an extent that at least maintains profits per partner, has become the sine qua 
non of partner selection. This shift in focus on what is considered a critical skill for 
advancement in the firm also re- shuffles the existing set of incentives for junior profes-
sionals as well as their involvement in service innovation.
Associates who aspire to partnership rather than any of its alternatives—and those are 
still plenty in our sample of firms—will want to develop and demonstrate their business 
acumen and innovation capacity. As the “book” of clients of senior associates is usually 
taken as a reflection of their revenue generating potential and, thus, a strong indicator of 
their quality as partner, they have a strong incentive to build a committed client base. The 
mere exploitation of established solutions, however, is unlikely to achieve that. Therefore, 
they are motivated to explore innovative ways of solving their clients’ problems and con-
vincing them that their current and future needs will be well served.
For the innovative capacity of the firm this means that within the new career structure 
innovation may spring from new sources in the organization, as entrepreneurial thinking 
and commitment to innovation trickle down the organizational hierarchy. As we elabo-
rate below, partners are likely to be increasingly motivated and involved in winning chal-
lenging client business that poses novel problems, rather than in solving them. 
Simultaneously, technical experts with a considerable transaction track- record—but no 
fee billing targets—are explicitly rewarded for sharing their expertise and experience with 
the firm. As a result, more junior associates are incentivized, but also empowered to 
engage in more innovative problem- solving, not least by more aggressively leveraging the 
firm’s knowledge base.
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Leverage Models
The more firms pursue new career structures and deploy increasingly senior teams, the 
more their overall leverage changes—both in terms of their ability to deploy existing 
senior knowledge and in terms of their partner–staff ratio. Importantly, the increased 
leverage of employing a higher ratio of non- partnered staff to equity partners only 
improves the all- important profits per partner as the key metric of law firm profitability, 
if the “bulge brackets” in the middle ranks are carefully managed.
Senior staff in non- partner positions bring to the table invaluable experiential knowl-
edge. However, the economics of positions such as of counsel and permanent associate 
require that these senior professionals are regularly deployed on client engagements that 
fit their seniority and therefore can be billed at rates that cover their relatively high com-
pensation. Therefore, the logic for partners must be to feed them work that is challenging 
and consistent with both their capabilities and their remuneration. For instance, perma-
nent associates are often introduced in practice groups where experience is paramount 
and—in contrast to other groups—clients are therefore willing to pay for it. As one 
partner clarified, “They wouldn’t work in my area, corporate law, because they block the 
way for younger lawyers and they are too expensive to justify. But in tax they would be 
useful.” Partners seeking challenging work ensure not only that the firm reaps sufficient 
value from its senior non- partners to justify the costs of their retention, but also that they 
do not become demotivated by the lack of challenge. Hence, there is a strong incentive 
for the firm to seek more than the exploitation of routine know- how and to encourage 
the exploration of new applications for existing senior knowledge.
This means that the effects of a new career model on the firm’s leverage eventually also 
impact upon its motivation and capacity to innovate. Like the firm’s pledge to junior 
associates to expose them to leading edge transactions, the accumulation of senior non- 
partners also motivates partners to seek business that intellectually stretches them and 
creates the opportunity for these senior professionals to draw on their accumulated expe-
rience to drive service innovation. However, the accumulation of senior experience 
increases not only the firm’s motivation but also its capacity to innovate.
On the one hand, parking talented non- partnered employees in permanent positions 
frees up partners’ time to win more cutting- edge business that requires innovation and 
is likely to involve clients in the co- production of new knowledge. Senior non- partner 
professionals are capable of taking on more challenging work than is expected of asso-
ciates in the traditional up- or- out model, and they are also less reliant on partners for 
input.
On the other hand, the increased availability of experienced professionals in positions 
such as permanent associate, legal director or of counsel addresses the problem of 
sharing hard- to- codify, tacit knowledge. Werr and Stjernberg (2003) suggest that such 
knowledge is more effectively managed and innovation fostered through “interaction 
between knowledgeable individuals,” ideally those who form part of the same commu-
nity of practice. As qualified professionals, experts in permanent positions are members 
of the same community of practice as those applying it, and often directly assist in appli-
cation.
PSLs, for instance, maintain systems of codified theoretical knowledge, but also tem-
plate methods, put together warnings of potential pitfalls in the application of certain 
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documents, and directly interact with those tasked with the actual transaction. They 
thereby enhance the flow of both “know- what” and “know- how,” provide relatively 
generic information without losing its richness, and foster the integration of theoretical 
and hard- to- articulate knowledge. Hence, employing a larger number of senior knowl-
edge carriers for database management while simultaneously making them available for 
personal knowledge- sharing facilitates the translation of codified theoretical knowledge 
into specific—and innovative—client solutions. As Werr and Stjernberg (2003) found in 
their study of management consultancies, knowledge codification strategies enhance 
service speed and quality, while personalization strategies enhance innovation. The use 
of PSLs as database managers and implementation assistants brings together both ben-
efits in a single function.
The introduction of permanent positions in more experience- based practice groups, 
thus, achieves an interesting split: It responds to the career needs of technically excellent 
employees who lack the skills to progress to partner, and it creates a distinct knowledge 
structure that makes tacit, project- based experience available to the wider organization. 
In this sense, law firms develop structural capital in knowledge and innovation manage-
ment that is largely built from human capital and can therefore actively participate in the 
translation of existing knowledge into innovative solutions (see Werr & Stjernberg, 2003). 
Such interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge has been considered critical for 
innovation (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). In our cases, juniors may turn to codified data-
bases for the theoretical knowledge that their task requires, but their senior colleagues 
can contribute the experience and tacit knowledge to apply and recombine it in innova-
tive ways—especially where they are part of the same transaction team.
Team Composition
The retention of more senior non- partner fee earners and the emergence of PSLs in the 
firm are reflected in the composition of each team. To pay for this, two things must 
happen: First, as explained above, partners have to keep feeding them work which is 
challenging and consistent with their experience. Second, associates must be able to 
rely less directly on partner input, both to keep billings under control and because part-
ners will be increasingly preoccupied with gaining additional work rather than doing 
it.
With regard to the latter point, senior non- partnered staff play a crucial role, making 
sure that junior staff are not only required but also enabled to engage in innovation. They 
function as the kind of “centers of excellence” that Werr and Stjernberg (2003: 891) iden-
tify with database maintenance and innovation in consulting firms, but fulfill a broader, 
double role in this context. On the one hand, PSLs codify knowledge by running prece-
dent databases and other forms of knowledge codification, such as the templating of 
know- how to make it accessible to junior associates and enhance their capacity for inde-
pendent work. As Werr and Stjernberg (2003) argue, the on- demand availability of this 
type of information facilitates leverage by improving the quality and speed of knowledge 
exploitation. The availability of such codified knowledge can indirectly foster innovation, 
as it accelerates access to the basic building blocks and frees up time to recombine these 
in innovative ways.
Simultaneously, however, the availability of a larger number of non- partnered seniors 
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per team means that associates can also access the rich experiential knowledge of other 
senior non- partner professionals. As former fee earning lawyers, PSLs not only catalogue 
precedents and documents, but also sanitize them for re- use in future transactions, and 
assist in their application. This can be especially helpful in making sense of theoretical 
knowledge that is especially complex and abstract and in translating it into innovative 
services. In sum, associates can tap into codified databases that help efficiently exploit 
existing theoretical knowledge as well as into their senior colleagues whose experience 
and tacit knowledge help in exploring innovative ways of applying it (Hansen & Haas, 
2001; Werr & Stjernberg, 2003). Hence, moving from a pyramid- shaped team composi-
tion, as was typical of the traditional up- or- out model, towards a rather diamond- shaped 
alternative fosters innovation by junior staff.
This means that innovations in career models offer the opportunity for firms not only 
to adjust their leverage and change team composition, but also to re- construct the roles 
of team members and create a clearer and sharper division of labor between associates, 
senior non- partner professionals and partners. Partners can be relieved from day- to- day 
work to a greater extent and focus more on client relationships and winning business. In 
turn, this clearer division of labor between winning work and doing it makes it more likely 
that innovation will spring from among the most experienced non- partners, that is, of 
counsel and permanent associates and those juniors who have been promised “leading 
edge” work as part of their skill development (Werr & Stjernberg, 2003).
Fee Billing Arrangements
We argue that the impact of permanent employees on the locus of innovation within the 
firm depends on the fee billing arrangements that apply to their positions. It will be more 
pronounced where they are not driven by billable hour targets, which are at the centre of 
the traditional logic of fee billing. The current logic favors current utilization over the 
“down- time” necessary to reflect on experience and generate innovations; that is, it rein-
forces the pursuit of exploitation over exploration. By developing roles such as the PSL 
that are not driven by utilization targets, firms create a win–win situation insofar as they 
respond to their employees’ wishes for better work–life balance and institutionalize inno-
vation capacity.
Following the new logic, there is a strong incentive for the firm to seek more than 
the exploitation of routine know- how but to encourage the exploration of new appli-
cations for knowledge held by senior professionals. In other words, positions that are 
not driven by utilization targets are more likely to reinforce the pursuit of exploration 
over exploitation. Exempt from the billing pressures that constrain the colleagues they 
serve, permanent non- partnered staff have more time to develop original knowledge that 
forms the basis of innovative services. When they are not tasked with directly support-
ing specific transactions, they can even explore completely new ways of thinking about 
problems and drive more profound innovations that are unrelated to existing problems 
and may open new opportunities for future services. In this sense, PSLs and other pro-
fessionals in permanent, non- fee earning functions, such as of counsel, who are allowed 
to go “off the clock” can themselves constitute an important source of innovation. This 
is possible because these senior professionals combine strong technical expertise with 
several years’ experience of working on client transactions. They work closely with 
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lawyers on transactions, providing a mix of support and advice work which deals with 
the intricacies of particular problems. They therefore operate at the frontiers of profes-
sional know- how in using a combination of formal knowledge (in the UK, precedents and 
statute law) and firm- specific or practice- specific know- how to resolve particular client 
problems.
It can be argued that this may herald the introduction of an R&D capacity, akin to 
manufacturing firms, in PSFs. While we have shown that innovation has traditionally 
happened on the job as individual professionals respond to client demands, now innova-
tion may become an independent function—importantly, one staffed by professionals 
who have the same credentials as those applying their expertise. Thus, the more firms 
invest in non- billable time by creating positions for those with expertise and experience 
to support the development of know- how, the more they are embedding exploration 
activities within the firm. Figure 7.2 summarizes how changes to the career model perme-
ate the firm’s organizing model and affect its capacity for innovation.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA
We started by arguing that innovation in professional service firms is distinctive in a 
number of ways that relate to its inputs (professional labor) and outputs (relatively cus-
tomized solutions to complex problems). The common explore–exploit dichotomy is less 
applicable to innovation in professional service firms, because innovation is not delegated 
to a separate organizational unit but is embedded in the core of the firm—namely in the 
everyday production process by client- facing professionals.
Consequently, the career model by which highly mobile professionals are attracted, 
motivated and retained is central to the functioning of professional firms. The traditional 
up- or- out promotion system has been—and still is—undergoing significant change 
towards a new holistic career model. We found that, by introducing such change to their 
career model, law firms are generating options for significant innovations to their tradi-
tional organizing model, which, in turn, have implications for the source and process of 
service innovation.
The new leverage model and underpinning diamond- shaped team composition suggest 
that innovations will continue to be sourced from within the production process itself, 
albeit from new places. If business generating ability rather than technical excellence 
becomes the key characteristic of partners, then young associates will strive to acquire 
and demonstrate this particular skill. They receive increasing support from non- partnered 
technical experts with considerable transactional expertise. PSLs, for instance, specialize 
in capturing and recombining knowledge, and senior associates, of counsel or legal direc-
tors take more responsibility for service delivery while partners seek business. Therefore, 
it may be argued that, as a clearer division of labor between partners, associates and 
senior non- partnered professionals solidifies, entrepreneurial mind sets, focused on 
“getting the deal done” for the client, may govern practice lower down on the seniority 
ladder, making innovation more pervasive in the firm, rather than the prerogative of the 
upper echelons.
Beyond detailing the specific changes and their effects on innovation, the model in 
Figure 7.2 also highlights the three key mechanisms through which changes in the 
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organizing model can effect changes in innovative capacity. Across all elements of the 
organizing model, innovative capacity is augmented where the change to the organizing 
model: requires increased innovative activity, for example to meet the economic demands 
of retaining a larger portion of senior, highly paid professionals; motivates innovative 
activity among members of the firm who were previously considered negligible in this 
regard, such as junior professionals aiming to distinguish themselves in the eyes of col-
leagues and clients; enables those newly motivated individuals to pursue their innovative 
ambition, for example by giving them access to senior professional know- what and know- 
how through the work of senior, non- partnered staff.
Importantly, it is the combination of all three elements—requirement, motivation and 
ability to innovate—that determines a firm’s innovative capacity. Staff who are motivated 
and able to innovate, but not required to do so because of the nature of their clients and 
assignments, are just as unlikely to innovate as those who lack ability or motivation. 
Conversely, a favorable combination of requirement, motivation and ability in the wake 
of the changes in career model we described is likely not only to enhance capacity for 
innovation, but also to shift the locus of innovation, namely from the apex of the team 
“pyramid” to the middle or bottom of the emerging team “diamond.”
These observable changes shed a first light on the link between career models and 
capacity for innovation in elite law firms and professional service firms more generally, 
but also indicate avenues for future research.
As our discussion of individual career ambitions and entrepreneurial predispositions 
as well as organizational incentives for innovation suggests, the link between career 
models and entrepreneurship should be studied at multiple levels, focusing on the indi-
vidual, organizational or institutional level, or on a combination of all three. Studying 
the interaction of institutional conditions, organizational policies and individual ambi-
tions will be particularly illuminating and help specific organizations, but also professions 
as a whole, to tap the innovative potential of their members.
Studies across different professional services should refine our understandings of the 
mechanisms by which changes to career models are translated into new capacity for 
innovation. As our analysis is based on law as an archetypical professional service, com-
parative studies that unpack the specifics of innovation in other, less regulated or more 
“creative” professional services will be illuminating.
Lastly, future research on careers and innovation should consider effects of interna-
tionalization on the level and locus of innovation in professional firms. As PSFs interna-
tionalize, they necessarily extend into client and labor markets of varying quality. Future 
research should examine how this increasing heterogeneity of staff, clients and learning 
opportunities affects the sustainability of established career models and the translation 
of local experiments into new and innovative services.
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